Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case that could result in a nationwide requirement that all mail ballots must be returned by Election Day in order to be counted. Most states have already adopted this policy; however, 14 states permit late ballots to be counted as long as the envelope is postmarked by Election Day. In the case currently before the Court, Watson v. Republican National Committee, the RNC and Libertarian Party of Mississippi challenged Mississippi’s law allowing late-arriving ballots with a valid postmark to be counted, arguing that the policy conflicts with the definition of “Election Day” in federal law. If the Court strikes down the Mississippi law, all states with similar laws will likely need to shift to an Election Day mail ballot receipt deadline before the 2026 midterm elections.

Regardless of how the Court rules, an Election Day mail ballot deadline remains a common-sense policy that states should adopt on their own because it reduces the risk of unnecessary reporting delays. In addition, mail ballot data from the 2024 election suggest that most voters will adjust their behavior in response to the new deadline, limiting the risk of widespread disenfranchisement. However, ensuring a smooth transition in the states that make the change will require proactive communication to voters about the new deadline, particularly if it applies to the 2026 midterms.

The deadline by which a mail ballot must be returned in order to be counted is an important state policy decision. The two main approaches are to set an Election Day receipt deadline or an Election Day postmark deadline. In the 36 states with a receipt deadline, mail ballots must arrive at an election office or be deposited in a drop box by Election Day in order to be counted. On the other hand, the 14 states with a postmark deadline will count ballots that arrive for a certain number of days after the election if they are postmarked on or before Election Day. The length of time states will accept late-arriving ballots range from a single day in Texas to up to three weeks in Washington.

From an administrative perspective, the benefit of an Election Day ballot receipt deadline is straightforward: It provides certainty to election officials on Election Day regarding the total number of ballots to be processed. Allowing ballots to arrive after Election Day introduces ambiguity into the ballot counting process during the critical time between the close of polls and the certification of results. In most cases, this will not impact how quickly an election winner is determined because the margin of victory is large enough where the late arriving ballots will not impact the outcome. However, in tight races, waiting for late ballots to arrive can lead to reporting delays that create a golden opportunity for false claims to gain traction. While Election Day ballot receipt deadlines do not eliminate the risk of delays and the spread of election misinformation, they do remove one major variable that can undermine the timely reporting of results.

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One of the primary concerns around an Election Day ballot receipt deadline is that the policy unnecessarily raises the likelihood that a voter’s ballot will be rejected due to an uncontrollable event (e.g., postal delay, personal emergency) that prevents the voter from mailing the ballot as early as intended. These scenarios are certainly possible, but a review of mail ballot data from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) suggests that the overwhelming majority of voters in states with an Election Day ballot deadline were able to comply in 2024.

According to the EAC, American voters returned nearly 48 million mail ballots in the 2024 election. Of those, 20 million ballots were returned in states with an Election Day ballot receipt deadline. Meanwhile, an estimated 100,000 ballots were not counted because they arrived after the deadline. This translates to a mail ballot rejection rate (due to missing an Election Day ballot deadline) of approximately 0.5 percent among ballots cast in states that do not count late arrivals.

Unsurprisingly, states that permit late arriving ballots reported a higher share arriving after Election Day. While this data is not captured in the EAC report, separate independent analyses estimated that at least 725,000 to 750,000 late arriving ballots were counted in states with a postmark deadline, accounting for more than 2.5 percent of the 28 million mail ballots that were returned in those states in 2024.

The difference between 0.5 percent of ballots arriving late in states where they will not be counted and 2.5 percent arriving late in states where they will be suggests that voters respond to incentives and are likely to follow the law in place where they live. In states that require ballots to arrive by Election Day, the vast majority of voters find a way to submit their ballots on time. Meanwhile, a portion of the electorate in states that permit ballots to arrive later take advantage of that flexibility. As states move to an Election Day deadline, it is reasonable to assume that most voters who are aware of the change will update their behavior accordingly and submit their ballots earlier to meet the new deadline.

That said, a Supreme Court decision requiring states to adopt the Election Day ballot deadline before the 2026 midterms is likely to pose some implementation challenges, as election officials will have limited time to educate the public about the new deadline. To mitigate this risk, election officials in some impacted states have already begun communicating with voters about the potential need to comply with new ballot deadline. While it is always preferable to enact election policy changes with ample lead time for implementation, changes driven by court decisions rarely provide election workers with that luxury.

Requiring mail ballots to arrive by Election Day is a reasonable policy that would ideally be enacted on a state-by-state basis with ample lead time before the next election. However, if the Supreme Court rules this summer that counting mail ballots that arrive after Election Day violates federal law, election officials in 14 states may need to quickly update policies in time for the 2026 midterms. While the tight turnaround could lead to a bumpy transition, Election Day ballot receipt deadlines are the right policy over the long term to reduce the risk of reporting delays and build trust in American elections.

Chris McIsaac is a Resident Fellow, Governance, at the R Street Institute, where he prepares research and analysis on electoral reform and budget policy.

By Kyle Koenen

Confidence in American elections doesn’t just depend on outcomes. It depends on voters trusting that the rules are being followed and applied consistently. That reality cuts to the core of the ongoing debate in Congress over the House-passed SAVE Act, its more ambitious successor the SAVE America Act, and the Make Elections Great Again (MEGA) Act.

Specifically, the debate around the SAVE legislation reflects legitimate concerns of voters. Americans want to be confident that only eligible citizens are voting in elections. Polling shows that a bi-partisan majority — roughly 89 percent of Americans — believe it is important to prevent ineligible voters from casting a ballot. A recent CBS/YouGov poll further suggests that 66 percent of Americans support requiring voters to provide documentary proof of citizenship, a key tenant of the SAVE America Act. That is a healthy instinct in a self-governing republic.

But as Congress debates what federal policy should look like as it relates to noncitizen voting, states already have the authority and tools needed to strengthen confidence right now. How? By auditing their voter rolls to identify noncitizens who may be registered to vote or have cast a ballot.

Several states have already undertaken these audits. Across these states, the pattern has been pretty clear: Audits uncover isolated cases, not widespread problems. A sampling of them:

• Iowa audited its 2.3 million registered voters and identified 277 noncitizens on the rolls, including 35 who cast ballots. An additional 5 noncitizens attempted to vote but were rejected.

• Georgia’s audit found that out of 8.2 million registered voters, 20 were not citizens and none had cast a ballot in the 2024 election. Nine had cast ballots in prior elections.

• Utah found only one noncitizen registered voter out of 2.1 million registered voters.

• Louisiana found 403 registered noncitizens, including 83 who voted in at least one election since the 1980s. The state has 2.96 million registered voters.

• Idaho discovered 36 “very likely” registered noncitizens in a pool of approximately 1 million voters.

• Montana found 23 possible noncitizens out of 785,000 voters.

Ohio and Texas are among the states that have undertaken similar reviews. Despite these state audits and other evidence showing that noncitizen voting is rare, states should still take the steps to conduct regular, transparent audits that flag potential noncitizen voting. Failing to conduct audits will continue to fuel distrust that is deeply rooted, with only about three in ten Republicans expressing confidence that votes are cast and counted accurately, according to one representative Gallup poll from 2024.

These efforts also respond to real concerns voters are expressing. In November 2024, 71 percent of Wisconsin voters approved an amendment to the state constitution reaffirming that only citizens may vote in Wisconsin elections, joining substantial majorities in 14 other states since 2018 to enact similar state constitutional provisions. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, a federal statute, expressly barred noncitizens from voting in federal elections under penalty of deportation and ineligibility to become citizens. But the recent state amendments are a clear signal that voters want both strong safeguards and confidence in the system. Audit procedures specify an enforcement mechanism: They are how that desire of voters can be put into practice.

So, how should these reviews be conducted? At the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, we released a guide that proposes a step-by-step framework outlining how Wisconsin should conduct a citizenship audit of its voter rolls in a manner that is both effective and fair. The process we propose is a funnel model, where potential noncitizens are flagged and further investigated at each step of the process.

The process would begin by identifying records within the statewide voter file that may indicate noncitizen status based on available state data, including information maintained by the state Department of Transportation. This could include green card holders or temporary workers who have Wisconsin driver’s licenses. Those flagged records are then reviewed using the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements, or SAVE, database to confirm citizenship status. This database, maintained by US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), is used by states and local governments to verify eligibility for public assistance programs.

An essential clarification at this stage is that any individuals flagged during this process are not automatically removed from voter rolls. Instead, they are provided notice and an opportunity to respond and demonstrate that they are eligible to vote before any action is taken. Only after this review process is completed are non-respondents removed from the voter rolls. These additional safeguards are important because they help to ensure that eligible voters are not mistakenly removed, as no database is 100 percent accurate.

This approach mirrors the one taken by Iowa and can be replicated in states around the nation. In fact, over the past year, the process has become even more streamlined for states, as USCIS has expanded access to the SAVE database and enabled bulk data processing, making verification more efficient for state governments. Now, entire state voter rolls can be processed in a matter of hours.

While it has been red states that have predominately taken advantage of the opportunity to conduct these audits, this should not be an inherently partisan effort. In fact, the results of these audits, which show only a small number of noncitizen cases, strengthen claims that noncitizen voting is not a significant issue.

But that doesn’t diminish the importance of this effort. Maintaining public confidence and ensuring accurate voter rolls are shared responsibilities of every state. In addition to conducting an initial audit, states should codify these reviews as a regular part of their post-election duties. Public trust in election outcomes is essential to a healthy republic, and citizenship audits are a practical way to meet voters where they are and ensure that trust is earned, not assumed.

Kyle Koenen is the Policy Director at the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, a law and policy center based in Milwaukee.

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By Don Henninger and Carlos Alfaro

Not long ago, about two dozen Arizona conservatives gathered for dinner in Scottsdale to do something that has become increasingly rare in American politics.

It was not a rally. There were no cameras, no speeches written for social media, and no press releases waiting to go out the next morning. Instead, it was a closed-door conversation about values.

We invited conservatives from across Arizona’s political and civic life, including business leaders, community figures, lawmakers and policy thinkers, to reflect on a simple but surprisingly difficult question: What does it mean to be a conservative in Arizona today? The attendee list was kept private, but each of us trusts the value of rich off-the-record conversations, having facilitated many of them in our careers spent around VIPs in politics and public policy. We also both care about this particular topic personally: One of us has worked for free-market causes, and the other was a career member of the “mainstream media” but also a conservative.

The conversation we hosted revealed something reassuring and something challenging — though “challenging” doesn’t necessarily imply “bad.”

First, there remains a strong foundation of shared principles beneath the daily noise of politics.

One of the clearest areas of agreement was a renewed commitment to the Constitution. Regardless of faction, those around the table spoke about the importance of constitutional order, the rule of law, separation of powers, and institutional restraint. If conservatism stands for anything enduring — that word, “conservative,” suggests that it does — it is the belief that freedom survives only when government itself is limited by law.

Another theme was opportunity.

Participants returned again and again to a core Arizona belief: that public policy should focus on removing barriers that prevent people from finding success, whether in education, entrepreneurship, or the workforce. The goal of good policy is not to engineer outcomes, but to preserve a system where hard work, responsibility, and initiative still matter.

That belief has long been part of Arizona’s political culture, from the state’s frontier roots to its modern entrepreneurial economy.

Family stability also emerged as a central value. Many spoke about the aspirations that have long defined the American middle class and the Arizona dream: raising children, building a stable household, and achieving homeownership. These social foundations remain essential to healthy communities and a thriving civic life.

Finally, there was agreement on a principle that sounds simple but carries real discipline. Government should be smaller, but making government smaller should not require making government bigger in the process. In other words, reform should reflect the same restraint conservatives expect from government itself.

But if the dinner revealed shared values, it also revealed something else that deserves attention: real disagreements within the conservative movement itself. The conversation did not always end in consensus. And that was the point.

Participants differed over the direction of the conservative movement nationally, the tone of modern politics, and the balance between principle and pragmatism in governing. Some emphasized the need for sharper political confrontation. Others argued that conservatives must focus on rebuilding civic trust and institutional stability. There were also differences about how conservatives should approach policy priorities such as economic reform, education, and immigration.

In other words, the dinner reflected something many Arizonans already understand: Conservatism is not a single voice. It is a coalition.

Yet what made the evening notable was not the disagreements themselves. It was the willingness to engage them honestly. In today’s political climate, disagreement is often treated as disloyalty. But conservatism has always been a coalition of traditions, including constitutional conservatives, libertarians, faith leaders, and business-oriented reformers. During the last decade, populist-minded versions of these have come to define the right; the “sharper-elbows” crowd.

Yet even with this additional friction, the dinner reminded us that disagreement, when approached in good faith, can strengthen a movement rather than fracture it. That goes especially for where the disagreement is approached: in person, not online, where individuals are forced to address each other human to human, not username to username.

It’s not surprising, then, there was a tone in that room, specifically, as opposed to a social media thread, which can feel scarce in today’s politics: hope.

The dinner did not produce a manifesto. That was never the goal. But it did reaffirm something important. Beneath the surface divisions of modern politics, Arizona conservatives still share enduring values such as constitutional fidelity, opportunity, family stability, and a belief in principled debate. At the same time, the movement is wrestling with genuine differences about tone, strategy, and priorities.

Acknowledging both realities, shared principles and real disagreements, may be the first step toward a healthier conservative politics. It does not have to begin in Washington, D.C. Arizona has always been a place where independent thinkers shape the future. It can begin here.

Those conversations are worth having. Civilly. Honestly. And together.

Don Henninger is co-director of the Arizona Democracy Resilience Network and Carlos Alfaro is the founder of the Arizona Talks Foundation.

By Matt Germer

In the Republican primary for North Carolina State Senate District 26, one of the state’s most powerful political figures was trailing a challenger by just 23 votes at the time of this posting. The race between Senate President Pro Tempore Phil Berger and Rockingham County Sheriff Sam Page is in the midst of an initial recount. But whatever the final outcome, the contest illustrates a basic truth about democratic government: democracy depends upon the consent of the losers.

Berger has served as the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate since 2011. He and his allies spent roughly $10 million on the primary against Page, in a race with just 26,249 voters. After certification from both counties in the district, Page leads Berger this year by a margin of just 0.08 percent.

The narrow result prompted the beginning of a recount process this week and may also result in additional formal inquiries to determine whether specific ballots ought to be counted. Berger filed four such protests on Tuesday.

While the people of the 26th Senate District are focused on which candidate ultimately wins, the rest of us should instead be focused on the loser and how that candidate and his supporters react to the loss. Electoral winners have every incentive to recognize their own victory as legitimate. What matters more is whether the losing side acknowledges defeat and picks itself up to fight another day. The health of our republic hinges not on the behavior of the winners but rather that of the losers.

If losing candidates refuse to concede and persuade enough supporters to follow them, democratic governance can deteriorate into factionalism and instability. Elections only function as a governing structure if the losing side, no matter how bitter, acknowledges the victor as legitimate and redirects its energy toward persuasion and mobilization for the next contest. If the result is not accepted as legitimate, political competition can shift from ballots to other, more violent means of contestation — as the world’s largest democracies know too well, from Brazil’s to, of course, our own.

Indeed, concession has become less automatic in recent years. Some candidates now refuse to acknowledge defeat, or they cast doubt on the legitimacy of the outcome. The “Stop the Steal” movement is the most visible example, but reluctance to concede has appeared across the political spectrum. The result is a slow erosion of one of democracy’s most important norms.

To be clear, candidates in close races should not be expected to concede the moment the polls close. Our electoral system can handle candidates zealously arguing they should be the rightful winner. We have certification standards and recounts, and even litigation may be justified. Those procedures exist precisely for races like the one in North Carolina’s 26th Senate District.

But once the ballots have been counted, the recounts completed, and the legal avenues exhausted, the losing candidate must accept defeat, even if the margin is razor thin and the outcome deeply frustrating.

Whichever candidate ultimately loses in North Carolina’s State Senate District 26, the moment may matter more for the legitimacy of democracy than the election itself. The losing candidate will help determine whether this contest becomes simply another close race or another small test of whether Americans are still willing to lose well. Hopefully, the losing candidate has the quality of character to lead well even in defeat.

Matt Germer is director of the Governance Program at the R Street Institute.

Vote-by-Mail: Deadlines and Pre-Processing

Vote-by-mail has become a central part of the electoral process in several states while simultaneously becoming politically controversial. Lawmakers have been asking two significant questions regarding vote-by-Mail: when must a ballot be received, and when can officials start processing them? Earlier this year, the American Legislative Exchange Council produced a model piece of legislation addressing these exact queries. Legislation on these topics is currently under consideration in Iowa, New Jersey, and West Virginia.

On the first question, a growing number of states are considering a requirement that all ballots — regardless of how they are cast — be received by the time polls close on Election Day, rather than simply postmarked by that date. This is a reasonable standard. It aligns with a logical assumption of the rules and, importantly, it helps produce timely results. Delayed results create space for misinformation and irritate candidates and voters alike.

Clarifying ballot receipt deadlines is not enough. Equally important is allowing officials to pre-process mail ballots before Election Day — verifying signatures, confirming eligibility, and preparing ballots for tabulation — without actually counting them early. The 2020 election made the cost of restricting this painfully clear. States like Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, where officials could not begin processing until Election Day itself, watched vote counting drag on for days. This delay led to rampant rumors and misinformation, even though all ballots were legally cast. Administrators should have the tools to work efficiently, and legislatures would be wise to give them that flexibility.

Citizenship Verification and Voter ID

These two issues are frequently lumped together, but each has distinct administrative challenges.

It is already illegal for non-citizens to vote in federal elections, and voter roll audits consistently find that the number of ineligible registrants is very small, with actual attempts to vote even rarer. That said, there is genuine public interest in documented verification, and states are actively legislating on it. Arizona has long been at the forefront of citizenship verification for registration, with Utah passing legislation to adopt the Arizona model earlier this year. The key question is who bears the burden?

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The best and most functional systems use existing government infrastructure — DMV databases, state and federal records — to verify citizenship on the back end, rather than placing requirements on voters at the registration desk. Rules that allow election officials to accept any valid ID that proves who someone is make the process smoother and less partisan.

Showing identification at the polls is also broadly popular, and 36 states have adopted some version of it. The case for voter ID is modest but real: it serves as a visible identity check that verifies the voter is who they say they are prior to granting them access to the electoral process. What it does not do, according to the evidence, is significantly suppress turnout or meaningfully reduce fraud, both of which remain rare. However, legislative efforts to excessively narrow the acceptable forms of ID, such as banning student IDs or out of state driver’s licenses, risk politicizing what should be a common sense process.

Election Certification

Certification has gone from a routine administrative step to a contested one since 2020, with more than 30 officials in various states refusing to certify results. Much of this stems from a basic misunderstanding of what certification is.

Certification merely marks the end of vote counting and allows the process to move forward. It is not an investigation, not an endorsement, and not a forum for contesting results. Those functions belong to the courts and legal processes that actually have the tools to examine evidence and issue binding decisions. When state law is vague about this, it puts administrators in an impossible position. They are asked to make judgment calls under political pressure with no clear legal guidance. Proposals that encourage officials to withhold certification based on subjective concerns about irregularities are not a check on the system, but a way of turning a routine step into a manufactured crisis.

The solution to this problem is clear: any state law should clearly spell out that certification is the administrative confirmation that counting is complete, and nothing more. One notable proposal in Virginia would clearly define an election administrator’s duties and discourage them from making rogue decisions.

Conclusion

Good policy in all three of these areas is dependent on clear, actionable direction for election administrators and minimal burden for voters. These are key to protecting the right to vote and ensuring trust in the results.

The following piece is by Tabatha Clemons, who was the Grant County (Ky.) Clerk from 2015 to 2025.

The legislative session in my home state of Kentucky is in full swing. This is the first one since 2017, however, that I haven’t been involved as an elected official. Between then and last year, I was the clerk for Grant County, where I also served in leadership roles with the Kentucky County Clerks Association (KCCA) and the Kentucky Association of Counties (KaCO).

Part of my role as an executive board member of KCCA was to provide input and work with state legislators on elections-related bills that affect our constituents and our work as county clerks. I’ve learned from relationships I’ve developed with other local election officials across the country that this process can be messy, to put it nicely — or it can be nonexistent at all.

That’s unfortunate not just for election administrators, but for the voters who rely on the process. Election administration is often technical and complex, especially these days when the security of personnel, physical infrastructure, and information systems are all challenges. Misunderstandings or poor relationships between election officials and legislators can lead to policies that are difficult to implement and leave us all on the losing side.

In my experience, however, the KCCA, State Board of Elections, Secretary of State, and the state legislature always embraced a collaborative spirit, putting Kentucky voters first. Here are three reasons why, parts of which might be useful as learning lessons in other states.

One, laws should be crafted so that voters can understand how elections work, while still maintaining the highest security possible. Kentucky piloted risk-limiting audits one year after the 2020 election cycle. In some states this works very well, but in Kentucky it was not straightforward. The next legislative cycle, we brought a new idea to the legislature to create an election audit. It is straightforward and verifies the ballots inside one machine, for one race with a hand count. The audit is open to the public with clear and defined administrative procedures, including a public draw for each of the 120 counties by the Secretary of State for the machine selected and the race just before the audit begins.

Two, KCCA works all year building relationships with our legislators — not just when they are “in session.” We’ve attended their local town halls and civic events and learned about their motivating factors for legislative change. Understanding someone’s motivations can open a new dialogue between legislators and election administrators. Additionally, the events attended show you care more than just to show up in the Capitol when a bill is active and moving through the legislative process.

Three, we stopped saying “no” and started listening more to learn, instead of being on the defensive. Attention on election processes and the individuals who run them has exploded since 2020. It can be difficult to tell the difference between genuine curiosity or earnest, and politically motivated attacks to gain likes and shares on social media platforms. But no matter what, Kentucky’s clerks have acted upon all this interest by being constructive with the voters and with legislators. We started taking their feedback and using it for opportunities to educate about Kentucky elections; to ensure that everyone has the facts they need to make good laws; and to see how we can improve our own jobs.

Although every state is different, all 50 are full of civic-minded people who want elections that earn the people’s trust and provide voters with a positive experience. Hopefully, these reflections from my time advocating on behalf of my fellow Kentucky clerks can spark some constructive ideas for the remainder of legislative sessions across the country, as well as plans for the future. The world is only getting more complex as technology evolves. We all owe it to voters and to history — the founding fathers who established the self-government we have today — to ensure that elections are straightforward, trustworthy, and reliable.

Tabatha Clemons was the Grant County (Ky.) Clerk from 2015 to 2025.

Supporters argue that stricter ID and citizenship verification laws are necessary to prevent voter fraud and restore trust in elections, while opponents counter that millions of eligible American voters could be disenfranchised if they cannot produce the documents required to prove their eligibility. Both sides likely overstate the impacts; however, the SAVE America Act indisputably creates a new administrative step for eligible Americans at registration (and at the polls in states that do not currently require photo ID). The SAVE America Act may ultimately pass, but if it fails, Republicans should look closely at Georgia’s approach to citizenship verification, which achieves the same goal of preventing noncitizen voting while imposing much less red tape on eligible American voters.

Georgia’s citizenship verification process consists of three main components working together to prevent most noncitizen registrations and to identify and remove any noncitizens who make it onto the voter rolls. The foundation of the system is the automated data sharing that occurs between the Secretary of State (SOS) and the Department of Driver Services (DDS). If a voter registers while obtaining or updating a driver’s license, the DDS has immediate access to the documents used and can automatically provide that information to SOS for the purpose of determining voting eligibility.

Similarly, applicants who register to vote by mail or online provide their previously issued Georgia driver’s license or state ID number. In cases where the individual provided proof of citizenship when originally obtaining the license or ID, DDS can share that information with the SOS in real time. This data sharing across agencies allows Georgia to confirm citizenship without requiring individuals to present the same document at different times to multiple state agencies.

The second component of Georgia’s approach deals with individuals whose citizenship cannot be verified through the initial DDS data check. True ineligibility is one reason this might happen; however, other examples include individuals who obtained their license or ID as a green card holder before becoming a naturalized citizen, and new Georgia residents who submitted a voter registration form before obtaining a Georgia license or ID. In these cases, local election officials request documentary proof of citizenship from the individual while the SOS proactively utilizes the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system administered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to check for a recorded change in citizenship status. If the SAVE check identifies the individual as a citizen, then their registration is automatically updated to reflect that change without the need for further action. If SAVE does not confirm citizenship (and the individual does not provide the required proof), then their registration will not be processed.

The third and final component is periodically conducting citizenship audits of the voter rolls and publicizing the results. By cross-referencing Georgia’s voter registration list with DDS data and the federal SAVE data system, reviewers are able to identify noncitizens who somehow made it onto the rolls. The most recent audit conducted before the 2024 election identified and removed 20 noncitizens among 8.2 million registered voters. Another 156 individuals required further investigation; however, this is still a tiny fraction of the state’s voting population.

Georgia’s approach clearly shows that citizenship can be verified in a manner that successfully prevents widespread noncitizen registration and voting without overly burdening eligible Americans. Effective collaboration across agencies is essential for state officials looking to adopt a similar approach and may require some investment in technology to facilitate the seamless transfer of data. Although it is reasonable for Congress to require more robust citizenship verification procedures in the states, the SAVE America Act’s one-size-fits-all approach is overly cumbersome and provides a large target for opponents to attack the policy.

Lawmakers will need alternative ideas for addressing concerns about noncitizen voting if the SAVE America Act should fail, and the Peach State is a great place to start.

Chris McIsaac is a Resident Fellow, Governance, at the R Street Institute, where he prepares research and analysis on electoral reform and budget policy.

It was 26 years ago, in November 2000, when Americans learned more about the mechanics behind the voting process than they probably cared to know. The election for President of the United States came down to fewer than 1,000 votes in Florida, and determining who won was not straightforward. A recount was conducted in several counties, and there were not clear rules for how to count ballots that had unclear markings.

One thing that was made perfectly clear, however: Americans from both parties realized that our elections processes had been neglected. The Florida fiasco made it evident that there was a need to update them. By the year 2000, most election jurisdictions were using infrastructure that was becoming rapidly outdated, such as the punch cards in Florida or lever machines in wide use elsewhere, and standards for maintaining voter rolls and auditing election results were lacking.

In 2002, the Congress and President George W. Bush worked together to develop the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), a law that was intended to address many of these problems. And it succeeded. Because of HAVA, elections in the United States have improved dramatically over the past quarter-century. Having worked on the professional staff of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, whose recommendations helped shape HAVA, I am very proud of how far our elections have come.

Today, when the legitimacy of the election system itself is being debated more than any time in recent memory, curious Americans of any type, from voters, to advocates, to politicians, should include the progress made under HAVA in their thinking. Two areas of improvements under the law have made the electoral process particularly more secure and more accurate: voter registration and post-election vote tallying.

Voter Registration

For all the angst today about voter list maintenance procedures state to state, consider this: Only 11 states had voter registration databases that covered every local election office in their state in 2001, per a report from the National Commission released that year. In the remaining 39 states, voter registration databases were held in each local election office, and there was no centralized mechanism for ensuring that voters were not registered to vote in multiple counties in the same state. There was also not a process for validating a voter’s information against either the state’s motor vehicle database, or against the Social Security Administration’s database. This lack of tools made the work of maintaining accurate voter rolls a more disorganized process than it needed to be, when technology was becoming available to make the process easier.

Thanks to HAVA, every state now has a central voter registration database, which helps to eliminate any duplicate registrations in-state. In addition, every person who registers to vote is verified against either the state’s driver’s license records or the Social Security Administration’s Help America Voter Verification system. If a person does not provide proper identification when they register to vote, they are required by federal law to show identification the first time they actually vote.

With a statewide system, conducting uniform list maintenance is much easier. States can search for duplicate registrations across the state — for example, by comparing names, dates of birth, and the last four digits of a person’s social security number — and removing these individuals from the rolls. States can also match their databases against the US Postal Service National Change of Address data to identify individuals who may have moved out of state. Once these matches are identified, local election officials can begin the process of removing voters from the election rolls, using the process outlined in a separate federal law, the National Voter Registration Act.

In addition, the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), a consortium of 25 states and the District of Columbia, was created in 2012, to help states match voters who may have moved across states and begin the process of removing duplicate registrations. ERIC was made possible because of the upgrades to state election data spurred on by HAVA. The U.S. went from having dozens or hundreds of municipal or county-level voter registration databases in each state, to having just 50 statewide databases nationwide. These HAVA-mandated statewide databases created the framework that allowed for state data-sharing though systems like ERIC.

ERIC has also been used to identify individuals who have voted in more than one state in the same election, facilitating election-fraud prosecutions, such as a recent one in Pennsylvania. Although the 15-year-old program has faced calls for reform, which are beyond the scope of this piece, the bottom line remains that participating states’ election rolls are cleaner with ERIC than without it.

Post-Election Processes

One of the fundamental issues in the 2000 Presidential Election was how to handle counting and recounting the ballots and how to ensure that the results were accurate. In Florida, there was not uniform guidance for how to review ballots and how to resolve discrepancies in vote totals. Different counties in the State used different standards to determine whether a person had or had not voted for a specific candidate. This variation in standards is, in part, what ultimately led the United States Supreme Court to rule to end the recount process in the case Bush v. Gore.

After the enactment of HAVA, all states were required to adopt uniform standards for how to adjudicate ballots where there was a question of voter intent. States developed manuals showing how various types of marks were to be tallied (or considered a non-vote, depending), so that today, in a recount, there is a uniform reference for reviewing questionable ballots. This uniformity means that everyone — candidates, political parties, and the public — are all made aware of how ballots in a post-election challenge will be reviewed.

In addition to the uniformity in reviewing ballots in a recount, there are also now more post-election audits of election results than there ever have been before. In 40 states and the District of Columbia, audits are conducted after every election to verify that the results are accurate, and the public can be confident in the election outcome. In 31 states, the audit must be completed before the election can be certified, and 9 states conduct their audit after the election has concluded. In almost all cases, these audits involve reviewing a sample of paper ballots to ensure that a hand count of the ballots matches up to the electronic results. These partial recounts often involve individuals representing both political parties coming together to count the ballots and verify that the totals match those in the local election management system.

A Bright Election Future

As readers of this piece have probably already realized, elections are a technical and multilayered process to administer. It’s understandable, then, to have questions about the ins and outs of it. As a longtime election researcher, and a current election administrator, I enjoy the opportunities to provide some answers. In this case, more Americans should know just how far the system has come in the last 25 years. If you told me then what our elections would look like today, I would have been skeptical.

It is true that we need to keep improving our elections and making voting more secure and more accessible, with more public audits that allow everyone to be confident in the results, whether their favorite candidate wins or loses. However, we are building on a strong foundation, much stronger than many people might appreciate.

Thad Hall is the Director, Mercer County (Pa.) Voter Registration and Election Bureau. He has held similar positions in Arizona and South Carolina, and was a member of the professional staff of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform.

It was a typical Tuesday morning in mid-December of a year none of us will forget — 2020. Sitting at my desk as the Assistant to the Board of Commissioners, my mind was drifting between end-of-year tasks, the upcoming Christmas holiday, and the excitement of welcoming newly elected Commissioners. Then my computer chimed with a new email.

It was from the county clerk-treasurer. That alone was not unusual; our offices worked closely together. But the message itself was puzzling:

“Have you ever thought about my job?” it read.

I read it twice. What did she mean? My reply was blunt in its confusion: “What job?” Her answer was even more unexpected, as if she were leading me onto something: “Clerk/Treasurer. Come see me during your lunch break.”

And so I did. When lunch came, I walked into her office unaware that the conversation would change the course of my career. She explained that she was resigning — an outcome of the immense strain the 2020 election had placed on her. Though she still loved the job, she had accepted another opportunity. Then she told me something that left me speechless: She believed I should put my name in to be appointed as the next clerk-treasurer.

I spent the next two days deep in thought. What would it mean to take on such a critical role to my community? Was I ready for it? Could I serve my neighbors in this way? Ultimately, I decided to take the leap. I submitted my name, and soon after, I was appointed to complete her term. That was five years ago.

At the time, I had no idea how expansive the responsibilities of the job truly were. Today, I oversee three departments. The Clerk’s Office manages Board of Commissioners meetings, Passport Services, DMV services, marriage licenses, business licenses, and more. The Treasurer’s Office is responsible for depositing and reconciling all county funds daily, overseeing investment accounts, billing and collecting property taxes, conducting tax sales, and more. And then there is elections.

This structure exists in many jurisdictions across the country — local election official is often just one part of a much larger role. Over the last half-decade, however, I’ve developed a deep passion for the elections side of the job.

In and following 2020, election officials nationwide faced unprecedented scrutiny, including widespread falsehoods about the nature of our work and the integrity of the system. The stress was immense. Turnover in election offices has steadily increased, according to research from the Bipartisan Policy Center and Issue One — and it’s difficult to say whether that trend could worsen given today’s political climate.

To kick off this Substack, at the outset of another federal election year, I find myself returning to that original question. And now, I ask it of you:

Have you ever thought about my job?

***

Based on conversations I’ve had with constituents, I would guess — and if we’re being honest — that most people haven’t given much thought to what local election offices actually do. For a long time, that made sense: Election administration was a community service that was obligatory, overlooked, and far from the political spotlight it occupies today. It made sense because the election administration profession doesn’t exist for the sake of horserace politics.

But let’s be clear: That remains the case today. If campaigns hand out yard signs that say “Vote for X,” election officials hand out stickers that say “I Voted!” Our pride is in the process — the people’s power to decide.

What has changed is the personal strain on local election officials, to do something patriotic and in the public interest. People rarely see the long nights, early mornings, and countless hours spent away from family. They don’t see the months of preparation, the intricate planning, or the extensive training required to ensure every election is fair, secure, and accessible. A survey of local election officials across the country, undertaken by Reed College, framed it this way:

One of the primary difficulties [to election offices] is managing workloads that spike dramatically during election periods, often overburdening officials with complex logistical, legal, and operation tasks. Hiring and retaining full-time staff is another persistent issue, as many jurisdictions struggle to offer competitive wages or long-term job stability.

And that’s especially the case in more rural jurisdictions.

There are other realities that voters are unlikely to see, including harassment and threats. Reed College’s survey found that more than half of election officials in jurisdictions serving 5,000 people or more — including me — reported experiencing personal harassment and/or threats during the last election year. About half overall said they know colleagues who left the profession at least in part due to safety concerns.

So why do we do it? Why do we stay in a profession that is often misunderstood, sometimes thankless, and now exposes the people who do it to unwarranted hostility? Because at our core, every election official I’ve met shares the same motivation: a commitment to the democratic process that defines our nation. Since taking office, I’ve engaged not only locally but at the state and national levels, working alongside election administrators from all corners of the country. Despite our different backgrounds and communities, our purpose is unified. We are not driven by outcomes or politics. We are driven by process: by ensuring that each eligible voter can cast a ballot with confidence, knowing their voice matters.

Our passion is for both integrity and inclusion, and the protection of a system that belongs to every American.

So, the next time you cast a vote, I ask you to remember the unseen commitment behind that simple act. Perhaps you’ll find yourself wondering, even briefly, about what it is that I do — and how what I do is mirrored by someone in your own community, one of more than 10,000 local election jurisdictions across America.

Amy Burgans is the Clerk-Treasurer of Douglas County, Nevada.